

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR.

WRIT PETITION NO. 651 /1996

PETITIONER:- S.R. Chavan s/o R.S. Chavan, aged about 45 years, Deputy Manager (Marketing), Cement Corporation of India Limited, Akaltara Cement Factory, District Bilaspur.

VERSUS

RESPONDENTS:- 1) Executive Director, Cement Corporation of India Limited, through its Chairman and Managing Director, Scope Complex, 7 Lodhi Road, New Delhi.

2) Executive Director, Cement Corporation of India Limited, 7 Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110030.

3) General Manager, Akaltara Cement Factory, Cement Corporation of India Limited, Bilaspur.

4) Shri P.C.Shrivastava, Retired D.I.G., Enquiry Officer, Flat No. 1269, Sector-A, Packet-8, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110030.

OATH COMMISSIONER R.K. Verma JABALPUR

PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI? MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT OR WRITS, DIRECTION OR DIRECTION, ORDER OR ORDERS.

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

SINGLE BENCH : HON'BLE MR. SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI, J.

WRIT PETITION NO.651 OF 1996

S.R. Chavan

versus

Executive Director, Cement Corporation of India Limited
and others

ORDER

Post for 5th-12-2006

Sd/-
SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI
Judge

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

SINGLE BENCH : HON'BLE MR. SATISH K. AGNIHOTRI, J.

WRIT PETITION NO.651 OF 1996

Petitioner : S.R. Chavan

versus

Respondents : Executive Director, Cement Corporation of India Limited and others

---

Present : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. P.S.Koshy, counsel for respondents No.1 to 3.
None appears for respondent No.4.

ORDER

(Passed on 5th of December, 2006)

By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner impugns the order dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16), whereby he has been dismissed from his service. The petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned order dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16), his reinstatement in the service with effect from the date of his removal from the service and grant of all consequential benefits including salary and seniority.

2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Executive Trainee in the respondent – Cement Corporation of India Limited in the year 1970. Later on, he was

confirmed on the post of Geologist in the year 1980 and was posted as Senior Geologist in the year 1983. In the course of his service, the petitioner was promoted and posted as Deputy Manager (Marketing). At the time of dismissal from service, the petitioner, being Deputy Manager (Marketing), was serving as head of the Marketing Department at Akaltara Cement Factory of the respondent – Corporation.

3. On 5-3-1993 at 7:45 P.M., a report was lodged by Smt. Ranju Singh, wife of Shri Vijay Kumar Singh, who was Graduate Sales Trainee in the respondent – Corporation, in Police Station Akaltara against the petitioner that in the night of 4-3-1993, her husband Shri Vijay Kumar Singh was on duty in the respondent – Corporation from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M. and she was sleeping along with her two children in Room No.5 of the C.C.I. (Cement Corporation of India) Guest House at Akaltara. At 2 A.M., the petitioner came and tried to outrage her modesty (Annexure P-2). On the basis of the said report, a criminal case, being Crime No.65/93, was registered against the petitioner for an offence punishable under Sections 456, 354 of the Indian Penal Code.

4. On 5-3-1993 itself, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order of the Executive Director of the Cement Corporation of India Limited. By the said order, it was also ordered that during the period of suspension, the headquarters of the petitioner shall be CCI, Regional Office, at Madras.

5. The petitioner had challenged the suspension order dated 5-3-1993 (Annexure P-3) fixing his headquarters at Madras in a writ petition, being M.P. No.1855/1993, which was dismissed by order dated 22-6-1993. Accordingly, the headquarters of the petitioner continued to be at Regional Office, Madras.

6. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 22-7-1993 (Annexure P-5). After receipt of the charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted his reply denying all the charges framed against him on 27-7-1993 (Annexure P-6). The petitioner also made a representation dated 27-7-1993 (Annexure P-7) to the Executive Director (Marketing), Cement Corporation of India Limited, New Delhi to stay the disciplinary action against the petitioner till the decision of the Court in the criminal case registered against him for the same charges.

7. On 18-10-1993, a notice was issued to the petitioner to attend the preliminary hearing on 5-11-1993 in the Guest house of C.C.I. at Akaltara. The petitioner did not attend the enquiry on 5-11-1993, therefore, the next date of hearing was fixed for 19-11-1993. Before the proceedings could be held on 19-11-1993, the petitioner made a written request to adjourn the date of hearing on medical ground. The adjournment was granted and the next date of hearing was fixed for 20-12-1993. On 20-12-1993, the proceedings were held at CCI Guest House, Akaltara. However, the petitioner did not participate in the enquiry and, therefore, a regular hearing was fixed on day-to-day basis with effect from 11-1-1994 and the petitioner was directed to attend the enquiry. On 11-1-1994, the enquiry could not be held as scheduled and was postponed to 19-1-1994 onwards. The

petitioner was again informed about the next date of enquiry fixed for 19-1-1994. The petitioner applied for grant of traveling and daily allowances to attend the enquiry at Akaltara as the petitioner was transferred to Madras, but the petitioner did not receive the said allowances. The petitioner did not remain present on 19-1-1994 for enquiry and the respondent – Corporation proceeded *ex parte* for enquiry against the petitioner. The *ex parte* proceedings were held on 19th, 20th and 21st of January, 1994 (Annexure P-10).

8. Thereafter, the petitioner was endorsed a copy of the letter dated 8-3-1994 (Annexure P-11) written by the Executive Director (Marketing) of the respondent – Corporation to the Enquiry Authority, in which it was proposed that the petitioner should be afforded another opportunity to present his case. On the basis of the said letter dated 8-3-1994 (Annexure P-11), the Enquiry Authority, by his communication dated 21-3-1994 (Annexure P-12), afforded another opportunity to the petitioner to present his case and directed him to attend the enquiry and present his case on the next date of hearing fixed for 15-4-1994 at 10 A.M. at CCI Guest House, Akaltara Cement Factory.

9. On 15-4-1994, the petitioner made his written submission (Annexure P-13) to the Enquiry Authority admitting all the charges framed against him and also prayed that under certain circumstances the act of said misconduct took place, for which he may be forgiven and a lenient view may be taken and he may be extended one more opportunity to serve the organisation. Thereafter, vide communication dated 8-6-1994 (Annexure P-14), the petitioner was informed about the submission of the enquiry report by the Enquiry Authority and the

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petitioner was also given 15 days' time to make representation in writing, if any.

10. The petitioner made a representation on 20-6-1994 (Annexure P-15) to the Executive Director (Marketing), Cement Corporation of India Limited, New Delhi to consider his case sympathetically and to take lenient view, keeping in view his 15 years' long and unblemished service rendered by him to the organisation. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16), the petitioner was dismissed for his service.

11. The petitioner, against the impugned order of dismissal dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16), preferred an appeal dated 22-8-1994 (Annexure P-17) before the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Cement Corporation of India Limited, New Delhi. The appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director by order dated 20-10-1994 (Annexure P-18).

12. In the meantime, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges for offence punishable under Sections 456, 354 of the Indian Penal Code, by the judgment of the Court of Judicial Magistrate Second Class, Janjgir dated 21-8-1995 (Annexure P-19).

13. Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity of hearing and the enquiry proceeded against him almost ex *parte*. Secondly, the impugned order of dismissal dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16) was not passed by a competent officer. The

competent officer was the Joint Senior Manager (Personnel) and the impugned order was passed by the Executive Director (Marketing). Lastly, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges for offence punishable under Sections 456, 354 of the Indian Penal Code, for the same offence the charge-sheet was issued and the enquiry was held. Thus, the petitioner could not have been dismissed under departmental enquiry when he was acquitted of the same charges by the criminal Court.

14. Mr. P.S.Koshy, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3, *per contra*, would submit that the petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing and on the very first date of hearing, i.e., 15-4-1994 he admitted all the charges framed against him (Annexure P-13). The petitioner has further admitted guilt in his letter dated 20-6-1994 (Annexure R-4) addressed to Mr. N.C.Jain, Executive Director (Marketing) in para 4 as under :-

> "4. That the next date of departmental enquiry was fixed on 15-4-94 by the Inquiry Authority in which I appeared.
>
> Due to the severe mental tension arising out of my suspension and psychological/financial problems which I was facing along with my family members at Madras, I decided to accept all the charges framed against me after having preliminary discussion with the Inquiry Authority, Presenting Officer, DM (P&A) Akaltara and also Shri S.S.Dhanaota Sahib, ED (Opns) who visited Akaltara on the same day. In view of the assurance given by them that the matter will be considered sympathetically and a lenient view will

be taken, I submitted my unconditional confession before Shri PC Srivastava, the Inquiry Authority on 15-4-94."

15. On the question of issue of the impugned order by a non-competent officer, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3 submitted that the petitioner was appointed by the Joint Senior Manager (Personnel) and the impugned order was passed by the Executive Director (Marketing), who is equal to the appointing authority and this question was not raised earlier in appeal before the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. The appellate authority – Chairman-cum-Managing Director dismissed the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 20-10-1994 (Annexure P-18). The petitioner cannot take advantage of acquittal in the criminal Court as the petitioner was not acquitted honourably. The petitioner was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubts by the Judicial Magistrate Second Class, Janjgir vide judgment dated 21-8-1995 (Annexure P-19).

16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the documents appended thereto. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity of hearing is factually incorrect. The petitioner was issued a notice along with a charge-sheet dated 22-7-1993. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted a reply denying all the charges framed against him on 27-7-1993. The petitioner further requested the Enquiry Authority to suspend the departmental proceedings till disposal of the criminal case. The departmental enquiry was accordingly suspended and the date was fixed for 5-11-1993, which was, at the request of the

petitioner, adjourned. The next date of hearing was fixed for 19-11-1993. One day before, on 18-11-1993, the petitioner send a telex message (Annexure P-8/1) expressing his inability to attend the enquiry proceedings on account of the fact that the petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance for the months of July, August, September and October, 1993. The petitioner was not paid traveling allowance for traveling from Madras to Akaltara. The matter was, thereafter, adjourned to 20-12-1993. The same could not proceed and the proceeding was adjourned to 11-1-1994. On 11-1-1994, the proceeding was again adjourned to 19-1-1994 to 21-1-1994. The petitioner did not attend the hearing. The depositions of management witnesses were recorded and one more notice was sent to the petitioner to attend the next date of hearing fixed on 15-4-1994. In the meantime, the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance upto the period of December, 1993 vide voucher dated 21-1-1994 (Annexure P-8/4). He had, thereafter, received subsistence allowance for the months of January and February, 1994 also. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Authority on 15-4-1994 and admitted his guilt without requesting for further enquiry in the case. The admission letter of the petitioner dated 15-4-1994 (Annexure P-13) reads as under :-

"Dt. 15/4/1994

To

Shri P.C.Shrivastava
Enquiring Authority
Camp – Akaltara Cement Factory
C.C.I., Akaltara
Distt. Bilaspur(MP)

Sub. : Departmental Enquiry.

...

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Dear Sir,

This is to bring to your kind notice that departmental enquiry has been initiated against me vide Memorandum No.PDE/4634/SRC/79/5612-13 Dt. 22/7/1993.

I hereby admit all the charges framed against me vide aforesaid Memorandum and Article of Charges(Annex.I&II of the Memorandum) unconditionally.

It is prayed that under certain circumstances the aforesaid act of misconduct took place, for which I deeply regret. I sincerely request that I may kindly be foregiven and a lienient view may be taken and I may kindly be extended one more opportunity to serve the organisation.

Thanking you,

Yours Faithfully

Sd/- 15/4/94
(S.R.CHAVAN)
DY. MANAGER (MKTG.) (U.S)
Cement Corporation of India Ltd.
Camp – Akaltara
Distt.Bilaspur(MP)"

17. On the basis of admission of guilt by the petitioner and on the basis of the other documents, the Enquiry Authority submitted his report on 4-5-1994 (Annexure R-7). The Executive Director (Marketing), agreeing with the report of the Enquiry Authority, passed the impugned order dated 9-8-1994 (Annexure P-16) imposing the punishment of dismissal from service with immediate effect.

18. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that no sufficient opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner is not sustainable. The second contention of the counsel that the impugned order was passed by a non-competent officer is also factually incorrect, as it appears that the Joint Senior Manager (Personnel) is equal to the Executive Director (Marketing). The petitioner could not produce any other proof to establish his contention that the authority imposing punishment on the petitioner was in any way junior or incompetent, being subordinate to the appointing authority. The last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner could not have been dismissed under departmental enquiry when he was acquitted of the same charges by the criminal Court, for which, the charge-sheet was issued and the enquiry was held. It is well settled principle of law that if the delinquent has been honourably acquitted in the criminal Court and the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar sets of facts, the delinquent should not be proceeded against in the departmental proceedings. In the present case, the acquittal of the petitioner is by way of granting benefit of doubts in favour of the petitioner. Even otherwise, the petitioner has clearly admitted his guilt in clear and unambiguous terms and abandoned the departmental proceedings.

19. The Supreme Court, in ***Capt. M. Paul Anthony*** **vs.** ***Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another***[1], observed as under :-

> "13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of

this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance."

20. Similarly, in the case of ***G.M.Tank*** **vs.** ***State of Gujarat and others***[2], the Supreme Court observed as under : -

"31. ..... Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the

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same requires to be taken note of and the decision in *Paul Anthony case*[1] will apply. ....."

21. In case of admission of guilt in clear and unambiguous terms, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in ***Jagdish Prasad Saxena* vs. *The State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh)***[3], observed that if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him.

22. The Supreme Court, in ***D.K. Yadav* vs. *J.M.A. Industries Ltd.***[4], observed that –

> "8. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person."

23. Further, in the case of ***Viveka Nand Sethi*** **vs.** ***Chairman, J & K Bank Ltd. and others***[5], the Supreme Court, while considering the applicability of the principles of natural justice, held as under :-

> "22. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. [See *Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.)* v. *Dr. Sumitra Dash*[3].] The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. (See *State of Punjab* v. *Jagir Singh*[4] and *Karnataka SRTC* v. *S.G. Kotturappa*[5].)"

24. With regard to scope of judicial review in case of imposition of punishment, the Supreme Court, in ***V. Ramana*** **vs.** ***A.P. SRTC and others***[6], observed as under :-

> "11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in *Wednesbury case*[4] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the

deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision."

25. The Supreme Court, in ***Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another*** **vs.** ***Girdharilal Yadav*** [7], observed as under :-

> "11. ..... In terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872 facts admitted need not be proved. It is also a well-settled principle of law that the principles of natural justice should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In *Bar Council of India* v. *High Court of Kerala*[1] this Court has noticed that: (SCC p. 324, paras 49-50)
>
> > *24.* The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that if a party after having proper notice chose not to appear, he at later stage cannot be permitted to say that he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing. The question had been considered by a Bench of this Court in *Sohan Lal Gupta* v. *Asha Devi Gupta*[2] of which two of us (V.N. Khare, C.J. and Sinha, J.) are parties wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held: (SCC p. 506, para 29)
> >
> > *29.* The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a

proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby.

25. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far.

(See also *Mardia Chemicals Ltd.* v. *Union of India*[3] and *Canara Bank* v. *Debasis Das*[4].)

In *Union of India* v. *Tulsiram Patel*[5] whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr Reddy, this Court held: (SCC p. 477, para 97)

97. Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, *nemo judex in causa sua* and *audi alteram partem*, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed."

26. Further, in ***L.K. Verma* vs. *HMT Ltd. and another***[8], the Supreme Court observed in para 15 that "it is now well settled that things admitted need not be proved".

27. The Supreme Court in ***Govt. of T.N. and others* vs. *S. Vel Raj***[9], observed that "the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and confirmed by the appellate authority were based upon the evidence led during the enquiry and it was not even contended that the said findings were perverse. It was, therefore, not open to the Tribunal to record contrary findings and hold that the charge against the respondent was not proved."

28. The Supreme Court, in the case of ***Kuldeep Singh* vs. *Commissioner of Police and others***[10], observed as under:-

> "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.
>
> 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which would be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the

conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with."

29. In another case of ***Yoginath Bagde*** **vs.** ***State of Maharashtra and another***[11], the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier decisions, observed as under :-

> "51. ..... The law is well settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In *Kuldeep* v. *Commr. of Police* this Court, relying upon the earlier decisions in *Nand Kishore Prasad* v. *State of Bihar*, *State of Andhra Pradesh* v. *Rama Rao*, *Central Bank of India* v. *Prakash Chand Jain*, *Bharat Iron Works* v. *Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel* as also *Rajinder Kumar Kindra* v. *Delhi Admn.* laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can the court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse."

30. In the case of ***B.C. Chaturvedi*** **vs.** ***Union of India and others*** [12], the Supreme Court observed as under :-

> "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct is the eye of the Court. When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappropriate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is

based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."

31. As a result, for the reasons made hereinabove and in view of several judicial pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in various cases, this petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

Sd/-
Satish K. Agnihotri
Judge

5-12-2006

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1 (1999) 3 SCC 679
2 (2006) 5 SCC 446
3 AIR 1961 SC 1070
4 (1993) 3 SCC 259
5 (2005) 5 SCC 337
6 (2005) 7 SCC 338
7 (2004) 6 SCC 325
8 (2006) 2 SCC 269
9 (1997) 2 SCC 708
10 (1999) 2 SCC 10
11 (1999) 7 SCC 739
12 (1995) 6 SCC 749

Gopal